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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal concerns the timeliness of a maritime 
indemnity claim under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11707, though its ultimate disposition 
turns on the application of an "unmixed questions of law" 
exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion.  The case arises 
from a shipment of furnace equipment by Tongil Co., Ltd. from 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin to Pusan, South Korea that arrived in 
damaged condition.  The goods were carried by rail from Milwaukee 
to Seattle by plaintiff Burlington Northern Railroad Company 
("Burlington"), and thence by sea to Pusan by defendant Hyundai 
Merchant Marine Co. ("Hyundai").  The damage apparently occurred 
while the cargo was in the possession of Burlington, but Tongil 
sued Hyundai for the damage.  The case settled and approximately 
one month following the settlement, Hyundai sought indemnity from 
Burlington, which refused to pay because notice of the claim was 
not given within nine months following the delivery of the 
shipment as required in a Burlington circular, adopted as part of 
the contract of carriage.   
 Burlington brought a declaratory judgment action in 
district court.  The court granted summary judgment for 
Burlington, and Hyundai brought this appeal.  Although the legal 
question implicated by the timeliness issue is an interesting and 
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important one, this appeal turns not on that issue but on the 
doctrine of issue preclusion, for Hyundai’s principal argument on 
appeal is that, in holding the notice of the claim untimely, the 
district court erred by failing to give issue preclusive effect 
to a decision by the District Court for the Western District of 
Washington in Atlantic Mutual v. OOCL, 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13284 
(W.D. Wash 1992).  That case involved an indemnity claim brought 
against Burlington by a different ocean carrier for damage 
sustained to a shipment of Samsonite luggage from Taiwan to 
Denver via Seattle.  The Atlantic Mutual court concluded that a 
time limit contained in a Burlington circular (adopted as part of 
the contract of carriage) did not foreclose the action in 
indemnity since such claims do not accrue and time limitations 
therefore cannot commence until liability is determined or a 
cognizable loss is incurred.  If this general rule for indemnity 
claims were applied in the present action, Hyundai’s claim would 
have been timely presented. 
 The district court in this case rejected Hyundai’s 
argument and refused to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to 
the issue resolved in Atlantic Mutual, relying on an exception 
for "unmixed questions of law," the scope of which is a question 
of first impression in this circuit.  While the continued 
viability of this exception has been called into question by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Stauffer Chemical 
Co., 464 U.S. 165, 104 S. Ct. 575 (1984), we conclude that such 
an exception for questions of law continues to apply, and that it 
is satisfied only so long as the issue involved is one of law and 
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either (1) the two actions involve claims that are substantially 
unrelated or (2) a new determination of the legal issue is 
warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in 
the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable 
administration of the laws.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 
(1982). 
 Because the Atlantic Mutual action and this case are 
not substantially unrelated and since a new determination of the 
legal issue involved is not warranted, we conclude that the 
district court erred by relying on this exception to the 
otherwise applicable doctrine of issue preclusion.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the order of the district court granting summary 
judgment to Burlington, and direct the district court on remand 
to grant issue preclusive effect to the decision of the district 
court in Atlantic Mutual.0 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  The Tongil Action 
 Hyundai’s indemnity claim originates in an action 
brought by Tongil in the District Court for the Central District 
                                                           
0
  Given our conclusion that the district court erred in failing 
to give preclusive effect to the Atlantic Mutual decision, we 
need not address the correctness of the district court’s 
resolution of the merits, i.e. its holding that the provision in 
the Burlington circular (adopted as part of the contract of 
carriage), providing an absolute time limit for the filing of 
claims, is not subject to the general common law rule of accrual 
in indemnity actions, which provides that a cause of action in 
indemnity does not accrue -- and thus that a statute of 
limitations does not begin to run -- until such time that 
liability is determined or a cognizable loss is suffered. 
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of California for damages sustained to a cargo of furnace 
equipment shipped aboard M/V Hyundai Innovator in 1986 from 
Seattle, Washington to Pusan, South Korea.  See Tongil Co. v. 
Vessel Hyundai Innovator, Case No. 88-04895 (C.D. Ca. 1988).  The 
cargo had originally been shipped from Milwaukee to Seattle via 
Burlington railcar.  On August 10, 1988, Tongil filed suit 
against Hyundai for the damages sustained to the shipment.  On 
December 15, 1988, in response, Hyundai gave Burlington notice of 
its indemnity claim, but Burlington denied Hyundai’s claim as not 
having been filed within the nine month time limitation 
prescribed in its circular and adopted as part of the contract of 
carriage.  In particular, Burlington relied on Item 12 of its 
Rules Memorandum 2-C, which provides: 
As a condition precedent to recovery, any 
claim for loss or damage to lading shall be 
filed with BN [Burlington Northern] within 
nine (9) months of the date of delivery of 
the shipment, or within nine (9) months of a 
reasonable time for delivery in the event of 
non-delivery.  Claim shall be supported with 
a copy of the shipping order, invoice, 
inspection report, or other proof of loss, 
and, if possible, the paid freight bill. 
 
App. at 107. 
 In the underlying action by Tongil against Hyundai, to 
which Burlington was not a party, the District Court for the 
Central District of California concluded, following a bench 
trial, that the cargo was in fact damaged while in the possession 
of Burlington; yet the court awarded Tongil $114,870.64 in 
damages, interests, and costs against Hyundai.  Hyundai appealed 
the judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
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reversed.  See Tongil Co. v. Vessel Hyundai Innovator, 968 F.2d 
999 (9th Cir. 1992).  Following the appeal, Hyundai settled the 
action with Tongil for $10,000 and then on January 26, 1993, 
requested indemnity of this amount together with legal expenses 
and costs totaling $104,079.49, which Burlington again denied. 
B.  The Atlantic Mutual Action 
 While Burlington was relying on Item 2-C of its Rules 
Memorandum to deny Hyundai’s indemnity claim, it was defending 
another indemnity action in the District Court for the Western 
District of Washington brought by Orient Overseas Container Line 
("OOCL").  See Atlantic Mutual v. OOCL, 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
13284 (W.D. Wash. 1992).  Like Hyundai’s claim, the viability of 
OOCL’s claim in the Atlantic Mutual action turned on the question 
whether the general rule for indemnity accrual -- that an 
indemnity claim "does not accrue until the indemnitee’s liability 
is determined by judgment or payment," id. at *9-10, and, 
therefore, that a statute of limitations on an indemnity claim 
cannot begin to run until such time -- should apply despite Item 
2-C of Burlington’s Rules Memorandum, which provided that the 
time limitation should be measured from the date of delivery. 
Atlantic Mutual had filed suit against OOCL to recover payments 
that Atlantic Mutual had made as an insurer to Samsonite Pacific, 
Ltd. ("Samsonite") for damages to a shipment of luggage en route 
from Taiwan to Denver via Seattle.  In response, OOCL had filed a 
third party claim against Burlington for indemnity for its 
liability to Atlantic Mutual. 
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 Burlington’s denial of OOCL’s indemnity claim was based 
solely on its contention that the claim was time barred since 
OOCL had failed to bring suit within the time period specified in 
Burlington Rules Memorandum 2-C.  This provision provided that 
"all suits against BN [Burlington Northern] shall be commenced no 
later than 1 year after the date of delivery."  Id. at *5.  OOCL, 
which notified Burlington of its claim more than one year after 
delivery, contended that this contractual limitations period did 
not alter the general rule governing actions in indemnity.  The 
Washington district court agreed with OOCL and concluded that its 
"cross-claim for indemnification is not barred by the limitations 
period in Burlington Northern’s Rules Memorandum 2-C."  Id. at 
*12.  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the 
opinion of the Ninth Circuit in States S.S. Co. v. American 
Smelting & Refining Co., 339 F.2d 66, 70 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. 
denied 380 U.S. 964 (1965), which it read as concluding that an 
"indemnity claim . . . does not accrue until the indemnitee has 
made actual payment."  Atlantic Mutual at *12; see also id. 
("[A]n action for indemnification accrues at the time of the 
indemnitee’s payment despite a shorter contractual time 
limitations period applying to claims between the parties."). 
C.  The Hyundai Action   
 Following the decision in Atlantic Mutual, Burlington, 
having already denied Hyundai’s claim for indemnity in connection 
with the shipment of furnace equipment on several occasions, 
instituted this action on April 1, 1993, in the District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, seeking a declaratory judgment 
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that Hyundai had no timely claim against Burlington.  In 
response, Hyundai filed a counterclaim seeking the $104,079.49 
from Burlington in indemnity, and moved to transfer both actions 
to either the Central District of California or the Western 
District of Washington pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), given 
that none of the facts in the present case or the underlying 
action occurred in New Jersey and that neither of the parties is 
incorporated or has a principal place of business in New Jersey. 
 Burlington responded by moving for summary judgment on 
its declaratory judgment action.  Hyundai opposed this motion on 
the grounds that (1) Burlington was estopped from relitigating 
the issues decided in Atlantic Mutual and (2) that, on the 
merits, Hyundai’s indemnity claim was timely presented.  The 
district court rejected both of these arguments, granted 
Burlington’s request for summary judgment in the declaratory 
judgment action, dismissed Hyundai’s counterclaim, and denied as 
moot Hyundai’s motion to transfer the case.  In rejecting 
Hyundai’s estoppel argument, the district court held:  "The Court 
interprets the Atlantic Mutual decision as involving a pure 
question of law, decided under the law of another Circuit, and 
therefore will not accord it issue-preclusive effect."  Dist Op. 
at 8.  This appeal followed. 
 Since the district court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment rested on a legal determination of when issue preclusion 
should apply to "unmixed questions of law," our review is 
plenary.  In reviewing the district court’s decision, we apply 
federal common law principles of issue preclusion since we are 
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examining the issue preclusive effect of a prior federal court 
action.  See NLRB v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 930 F.2d 316, 320 
(3d Cir. 1991); Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1166 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
II.  ISSUE PRECLUSION  
A.  Introduction  
 The doctrine of issue preclusion,0 which is at issue in 
this action, derives from the simple principle that "later courts 
should honor the first actual decision of a matter that has been 
actually litigated."  18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4416 (1981) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].0  This 
                                                           
0
  The doctrine describing the effect of former adjudications on 
subsequent actions has a number of aspects, and is referred to by 
a variety of terms, including res judicata, merger, bar, and 
collateral and direct estoppel.  See 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET. AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (1981) (tracing the varying 
terminology employed in this area).  Throughout this opinion we 
use the phrases "issue preclusion" and "collateral estoppel" 
interchangeably to refer to the rule, applicable to this action, 
providing preclusive effect to a fact, question, or right 
determined in a prior case. 
0
  Nearly a century ago, the first Justice Harlan eloquently set 
forth the rationales supporting the application of issue 
preclusion as follows: 
 
 The general principle announced in 
numerous cases is that a right, question, or 
fact distinctly put in issue, and directly 
determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot 
be disputed in a subsequent suit between the 
same parties or their privies; and, even if 
the second suit is for a different cause of 
action, the right, question, or fact once so 
determined must, as between the same parties 
or their privies, be taken as conclusively 
established, so long as the judgment in the 
first suit remains unmodified.  This general 
rule is demanded by the very object for which 
civil courts have been established, which is 
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doctrine ensures that "once an issue is actually and necessarily 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that 
determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a 
different cause of action involving a party to the prior 
litigation,"  Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S. 
Ct. 970, 973 (1979).  The prerequisites for the application of 
issue preclusion are satisfied when:  “(1) the issue sought to be 
precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) 
that issue was actually litigated; (3) it was determined by a 
final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] 
essential to the prior judgment.”  In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 
1097 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 628-29 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 782 (1991)). 
 Complete identity of parties in the two suits is not 
required for the application of issue preclusion.  Here Hyundai, 
which was not a party to the first suit (the Atlantic Mutual 
action), attempts to use issue preclusion offensively against 
Burlington, which was a party in the first action.  Such an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to secure the peace and repose of society by 
the settlement of matters capable of judicial 
determination.  Its enforcement is essential 
to the maintenance of social order; for the 
aid of judicial tribunals would not be 
invoked for the vindication of rights of 
person and property if, as between parties 
and their privies, conclusiveness did not 
attend the judgments of such tribunals in 
respect of all matters properly put in issue 
and actually determined by them. 
 
Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S. 
Ct. 18, 27 (1897). 
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application of issue preclusion is referred to as offensive0 non-
mutual0 collateral estoppel, which has been recognized as proper 
by the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 (1979).0  The Court in Parklane 
concluded that "a litigant who was not a party to a prior 
judgment may nevertheless use that judgment ‘offensively’ to 
prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the 
earlier proceeding," id. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 649, subject to an 
overriding fairness determination by the trial judge.0 
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  The offensive use of collateral estoppel "occurs when the 
plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from relitigating an 
issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an 
action with another party," while, in contrast, defensive use 
"occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from 
asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost 
against another defendant."  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322, 326 n.4, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 n.4 (1979).  Because the 
indemnity claimant, Hyundai, seeks to prevent Burlington from 
relitigating an issue that Burlington lost against a prior 
claimant, OOCL, in a prior action, this case involves the 
application of offensive collateral estoppel.  The fact that 
Burlington preemptively brought this action for declaratory 
judgment, seeking to avoid indemnity liability, does not alter 
the structural essence of the case. 
0
  It is non-mutual because OOCL and not Hyundai was the 
plaintiff in the prior action.  In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
439 U.S. 322, 326-28, 99 S. Ct. 645, 651-52 (1979), the Supreme 
Court disavowed a requirement of mutuality for issue preclusion 
to bar a party from relitigating an issue. 
0
  Previously, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University 
of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29, 91 S. Ct. 1434, 
1442-43 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized defensive non-mutual 
collateral estoppel, precluding a patentee from relitigating the 
validity of a patent because a federal court in a previous 
lawsuit had already declared the patent invalid.  
0
  In reaching this conclusion, however, the Parklane Court 
recognized that two reasons, not implicated in the present 
action, counseled against the application of offensive, as 
opposed to defensive, non-mutual issue preclusion.  First, its 
availability could create an incentive for potential plaintiffs 
"to adopt a `wait and see' attitude, in the hope that the first 
12 
B.  The Exception for Unmixed Questions of Law 
 In this action, the parties did not dispute (with one 
exception detailed in the margin) that all of the primary 
requirements for application of non-mutual offensive collateral 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
action will result in a favorable judgment," since such 
plaintiffs "will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a 
defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant 
wins."  Id. at 330, 99 S. Ct. at 651.  Second, offensive use of 
collateral estoppel may be "unfair to a defendant," to the extent 
that: (1) the defendant may have been sued in the first action 
for "small or nominal damages" for which "he may have [had] 
little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future 
suits [were] not foreseeable"; (2) the "judgment relied upon for 
a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more 
previous judgments in favor of the defendant"; or (3) "the second 
action affords the defendant procedural opportunities [e.g. 
discovery procedures] unavailable in the first action that could 
readily cause a different result."  Id. at 330, 99 S. Ct. at 651.  
Acknowledging these concerns the Parklane Court nevertheless 
allowed trial courts to determine in proper cases that non-mutual 
offensive collateral estoppel should be applied.  The Court 
stated that the "general rule" is "that in cases where a 
plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or 
where, either for the reasons discussed above or for other 
reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to 
a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive 
collateral estoppel."  Id. at 331, 99 S. Ct. at 651-52. 
 Following Parklane, the Court in United States v. 
Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984), limited the 
application of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel by 
concluding that it could not be applied against the federal 
government.  The Court reasoned that such a policy "would 
substantially thwart the development of important questions of 
law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular 
legal issue."  Id. at 160, 104 S. Ct. at 572.  The Court 
explained that "[a]llowing one final adjudication would deprive 
this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting several 
courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this 
court grants certiorari." Id.  "Indeed," the Court observed, "if 
nonmutual estoppel were routinely applied against the Government, 
this Court would have to revise its practice of waiting for a 
conflict to develop before granting the Government’s petitions 
for certiorari."  Id. 
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estoppel were satisfied0 and the sole basis of the district 
court’s decision not to apply issue preclusion in this action was 
based on an exception for "unmixed question[s] of law."  In this 
appeal, Hyundai contends that the district court erred in 
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  Burlington submits that the Atlantic Mutual decision, which 
denied Burlington’s request for summary judgment, was not final 
since it was "not appealable," and hence it cannot be granted 
preclusive effect.  The district court did not reach this 
contention, choosing instead to rely on the exception for unmixed 
questions of law.  We reject Burlington’s argument. 
 As we recognized in In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d 
Cir. 1991), the concept of finality for purposes of "collateral 
estoppel does not require the entry of a judgment final in the 
sense of being appealable."  Instead, "the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel applies whenever an action is sufficiently firm to be 
accorded conclusive effect."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We concluded there that "[t]he wisest course [was] to 
regard the prior decision of the issue as final for the purpose 
of issue preclusion without awaiting the end judgment."  Id.  
Brown held that "[i]n determining whether the resolution was 
sufficiently firm, the second court should consider whether the 
parties were fully heard, whether a reasoned opinion was filed, 
and whether that decision could have been, or actually was, 
appealed."  Id.  (We admitted, however, that "[f]inality ‘may 
mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue 
has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good reason 
for permitting it to be litigated again.’"  Id. (quoting Dyndul 
v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 412 n.8 (3d Cir. 1980)).) 
 This finality requirement is satisfied in this case. 
Burlington "w[as] represented by counsel (in this case two 
separate firms), . . . [t]he issues were genuinely contested, and 
the court gave no indication that the summary judgment was 
tentative or likely to be changed."  See Brown, 951 F.2d at 569.  
Moreover, the Atlantic Mutual court did not summarily deny 
Burlington’s summary judgment motion on (for example) grounds 
that there were material factual disputes; rather, it ruled in a 
reasoned opinion that Burlington’s timeliness defense was 
unsuccessful as a matter of law.  Under all these circumstances, 
the fact that the decision was not actually appealable is of 
little consequence in this action. See Dyndul, 620 F.2d at 412 
("‘[F]inality’ for purposes of issue preclusion is a more 
‘pliant’ concept than it would be in other contexts.").  
Accordingly, we conclude that the denial of summary judgment in 
Atlantic Mutual is sufficiently final to be given issue 
preclusive effect in this action. 
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applying this exception, and in refusing to grant issue 
preclusive effect to the decision of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington in Atlantic Mutual. 
The viability and/or proper scope of the exception for "unmixed 
questions of law" is an issue of first impression in this 
Circuit. 
 The Restatement (Second) of Judgments defines the 
exception for "unmixed questions of law" as follows: 
 § 28.   Exceptions to the General Rule 
of Issue Preclusion 
 
Although an issue is actually litigated and 
determined by a valid and final judgment, and 
the determination is essential to the 
judgment, relitigation of the issue in the 
subsequent action between the parties is not 
precluded in the following circumstances: 
 
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) 
the two actions involve claims that 
are substantially unrelated, or (2) 
a new determination is warranted in 
order to take account of an 
intervening change in the 
applicable legal context or 
otherwise to avoid inequitable 
administration of the laws. 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2) (1982).0 
                                                           
0
  A leading treatise suggests a similar framework for 
determining whether the exception for "unmixed questions of law" 
should apply.  See 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 4425, at 253-54 
("Preclusion should not apply if there has been either a change 
in the facts or the governing rules.").  This framework proceeds 
as follows:  First, the treatise suggests that preclusion should 
not apply unless "[i]dentity of the issue is established by 
showing that the same general legal rules govern both cases and 
that the facts of both cases are indistinguishable as measured by 
those rules."  Id. (footnotes omitted).  Second, it states that 
"[p]reclusion also may be defeated by showing either that special 
reasons make it inappropriate in a particular legal setting, or 
15 
 This exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion has 
its roots in a statement made by the Supreme Court over seventy 
years ago in United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S. Ct. 66 
(1924).  Moser was a retired Navy captain, who successfully 
contended, in an initial case before the U.S. Court of Claims, 
that time spent as a Naval Academy cadet during the Civil War 
qualified as "serv[ice] during the civil war", entitling him to a 
pension enhancement under an applicable pension statute.  Moser, 
266 U.S. at 240, 45 S. Ct. at 66.  In a later case, which did not 
involve Moser, the Court of Claims changed its interpretation of 
the pension statute and concluded that service as a naval cadet 
did not qualify as "serv[ice] during the war" under the statute. 
Id.  Notwithstanding this change in the law, in subsequent 
actions brought by Moser for later installments of his enhanced 
pension benefits, the Court of Claims relied on, inter alia, the 
doctrine of issue preclusion to permit Moser to continue to 
receive the enhanced pension benefits.  The government appealed, 
and the Supreme Court affirmed the application of issue 
preclusion. 
 In Moser, the Court addressed, and rejected, the 
contention that issue preclusion should not apply on the ground 
that a pure question of law was involved: 
The contention of the Government seems to be 
that the doctrine of res judicata does not 
apply to questions of law; and, in a sense, 
that is true.  It does not apply to unmixed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that there has been a substantial change in the legal climate 
that suggests a new understanding of the governing legal rules 
which may require a different application."  Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
16 
questions of law.  Where, for example, a 
court in deciding a case has enunciated a 
rule of law, the parties in a subsequent 
action upon a different demand are not 
estopped from insisting that the law is 
otherwise, merely because the parties are the 
same in both cases.  But a fact, question or 
right distinctly adjudged in the original 
action cannot be disputed in a subsequent 
action, even though the determination was 
reached upon an erroneous view or by an 
erroneous application of the law.  That would 
be to affirm the principle in respect of the 
thing adjudged but, at the same time, deny it 
all efficacy by sustaining a challenge to the 
grounds upon which the judgment was based. 
  
Id. at 242, 45 S. Ct. at 67.  Thus the Court concluded that 
"[t]he question expressly and definitely presented in this suit 
is the same as that definitely and actually litigated and 
adjudged in favor of the claimant in the three preceding suits, 
viz: whether he occupied the status of an officer who had served 
during the civil war."  Id. at 242, 45 S. Ct. at 67.  For this 
reason, the Court concluded issue preclusion was proper. 
 The Supreme Court next addressed the possible 
application of this exception some fifty-five years later in 
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 S. Ct. 970 (1979), a 
case of mutual defensive collateral estoppel which involved 
successive Supremacy Clause challenges to Montana’s imposition of 
a one percent gross receipts tax on public, but not private, 
construction projects.  In the initial action, a public 
contractor, financed by the federal government, litigated the 
constitutionality of the tax in state court.  The Montana Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld the tax.  Instead of seeking certiorari, 
17 
the government, acting on its own behalf, brought a similar 
challenge in the federal district court in Montana, and that case 
reached the Supreme Court. 
 The Supreme Court determined that, under these 
circumstances, mutuality of parties existed since the government, 
which directed the litigation on behalf of the public contractor 
in the first action, was, for all practical purposes, the party 
in the first action.  The Court affirmed the defensive use of 
mutual collateral estoppel against the federal government since 
the issue sought to be litigated was identical to the issue 
already litigated in the state court action and no change in 
controlling facts or legal principles had occurred.  Id. at 155-
62, 99 S. Ct. at 974-78.  The Court rejected the contention that 
issue preclusion should not apply under an exception for "unmixed 
question of law": 
Of possible relevance is the exception which 
obtains for "unmixed questions of law" in 
successive actions involving substantially 
unrelated claims. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [W]hen issues of law arise in 
successive actions involving unrelated 
subject matter, preclusion may be 
inappropriate.  This exception is of 
particular importance in constitutional 
adjudication.  Unreflective invocation of 
collateral estoppel against parties with an 
ongoing interest in constitutional issues 
could freeze doctrine in areas of the law 
where responsiveness to changing patterns of 
conduct or social mores is critical.  To be 
sure, the scope of the Moser exception may be 
difficult to delineate, particularly where 
there is partial congruence in the subject 
matter of successive disputes. But the 
instant case poses no such conceptual 
difficulties.  Rather, as the preceding 
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discussion indicates, the legal "demands" of 
this litigation are closely aligned in time 
and subject matter to those in [the previous 
litigation]. 
 
Id. at 162-63, 99 S. Ct. at 978 (citations omitted). 
 The Supreme Court most recently addressed the proper 
scope of this exception in United States v. Stauffer Chemical 
Co., 464 U.S. 165, 104 S. Ct. 575 (1984), which involved 
successive actions brought by the EPA against Stauffer in 
response to the company’s refusal to submit to inspections by 
private contractors hired by the EPA.  At issue was whether 
private contractors were "authorized representatives" under 
§ 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act.  In the initial action, which 
involved an attempt by the EPA to inspect Stauffer's Wyoming 
plant, the Tenth Circuit held for Stauffer, concluding that 
private contractors were not "authorized representatives" under 
the statute.  The identical question then arose with regard to an 
EPA inspection of Stauffer's Tennessee plant, leading the Sixth 
Circuit to conclude, inter alia, that the federal government was 
estopped from relitigating the question whether private 
contractors constituted authorized representatives under the 
Clean Air Act. 
 The government appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed, 
concluding "that the doctrine of mutual defensive collateral 
estoppel is applicable against the Government to preclude 
relitigation of the same issue already litigated against the same 
party in another case involving virtually identical facts."  Id. 
at 169, 104 S. Ct. at 578.  In so doing it rejected the 
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government’s reliance on an exception for "unmixed questions of 
law" and expressed serious doubt regarding the proper scope of 
the exception: 
While our discussion in Montana indicates 
that the exception is generally recognized, 
we are frank to admit uncertainty as to its 
application.  The exception seems to require 
a determination as to whether an "issue of 
fact" or an "issue of law" is sought to be 
relitigated and then a determination as to 
whether the "issue of law" arises in a 
successive case that is so unrelated to the 
prior case that relitigation of the issue is 
warranted.  Yet we agree that, for the 
purpose of determining when to apply an 
estoppel, when the claims in two separate 
actions between the same parties are the same 
or are closely related it is not ordinarily 
necessary to characterize an issue as one of 
fact or of law for purposes of issue 
preclusion.  In such a case, it is unfair to 
the winning party and an unnecessary burden 
on the courts to allow repeated litigation of 
the same issue in what is essentially the 
same controversy, even if the issue is 
regarded as one of "law." 
 
Id. at 171, 104 S. Ct. at 579 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  The Court further explained that “[a]n 
exception which requires a rigid determination of whether an 
issue is one of fact, law, or mixed fact and law, as a practical 
matter, would often be impossible to apply because the journey 
from a pure question of fact to a pure question of law is one of 
subtle gradations rather than one marked by a rigid divide.”  Id. 
at 171 n.4, 104 S. Ct. at 579 n.4. 
 Hyundai contends that given these statements, the 
Stauffer Court effectively overruled the issue preclusion 
exception for "unmixed questions of law."  We disagree.  Despite 
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its diffidence and ruminations, we do not believe that the 
Court’s decision in Stauffer overruled the exception for unmixed 
questions of law as set forth in the Restatement and by Wright & 
Miller.  See 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 4425, at 198 (1994 Supp.) 
("The approach suggested in the main volume is supported by the 
result reached in United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co." (footnote 
omitted)).0 
 In Stauffer, the Court found the prerequisites for the 
exception for unmixed questions of law unsatisfied.  The Court 
determined that neither of the two elements justifying 
application of the exception to issue preclusion for unmixed 
questions of law were present: "The Government does not argue 
that the § 114(a)(2) issues in Stauffer I and Stauffer II are 
dissimilar nor that controlling law or facts have changed since 
Stauffer I."  Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 170, 104 S. Ct. at 578.  In 
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  With regard to Stauffer, Wright and Miller have acknowledged 
that 
 
it remains unclear just where the Court’s 
opinion will lead.  It is confessed that 
there is no clear sense of the purposes that 
may limit preclusion as to matters of law.  
No attempt is made to work through the 
different policies that may apply in 
different settings, so as to push preclusion 
closer to abstract issues of law or to 
confine it closer to commingled issues of law 
and common fact.  The result might be a broad 
expansion of preclusion.  The reasons for 
caution are sufficiently strong, however, to 
rely on the opinion as a possibly appropriate 
response to the specific case without reading 
it as establishing a new general policy. 
 
18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 4425, at 198 (1994 Supp.). 
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particular, the Court analogized to its decision in Montana, 
where it "determined that the exception was inapplicable because 
of the close alignment of time and subject matter between the 
[two actions],"0 id. at 172, 104 S. Ct. at 579.  The Court 
reasoned in Stauffer that "[a]ny factual differences between the 
two cases [the prior and instant adjudications], such as the 
difference in the location of the plants and the difference in 
the private contracting firms involved, are of no legal 
significance whatever in resolving the issue presented in both 
cases."  Id. at 172, 104 S. Ct. at 579.    
 Admitting that "the purpose underlying the exception 
for ‘unmixed questions of law’ in successive actions on unrelated 
claims is far from clear," id., the Court concluded:  "whatever 
its purpose or extent, we think that there is no reason to apply 
it here . . ., [and doing so] would substantially frustrate the 
doctrine's purpose of protecting litigants from burdensome 
relitigation and of promoting judicial economy."  Id.  Moreover, 
the Court rejected the government’s argument that "two cases 
presenting the same legal issue must arise from the very same 
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  In particular, the court reasoned: 
 
Both Stauffer I and Stauffer II arose as a 
result of EPA's overview inspection program 
for supervising state efforts to enforce 
national air quality standards.  In both 
cases private contractors, in addition to EPA 
and state employees, tried to inspect plants 
owned by respondent.  The inspections 
occurred just over two weeks apart, and in 
each case, Stauffer refused to allow the 
private contractors to enter its plant.   
 
Id. at 579. 
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facts or transaction before an estoppel can be applied."  Id. at 
172 n.5, 104 S. Ct. at 579 n.5.  "Whatever applicability that 
interpretation may have in the tax context, see Commissioner v. 
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601-602 (1948) (refusing to apply an 
estoppel when two tax cases presenting the same issue arose from 
‘separable facts’), [the Court] reject[ed] its general 
applicability outside of that context."  Id.0 
 In sum, the Stauffer opinion is consistent with the 
approach codified in the Restatement.  See Clark-Cowlitz Joint 
Operating Agency v. F.E.R.C., 775 F.2d 366, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(recognizing after the Court’s decision in Stauffer that "the 
test for the exception seems to be . . . whether ‘the issue of 
law arises in a successive case that is so unrelated to the prior 
case that relitigation of the issue is warranted.’" (quoting 
Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 171, 104 S. Ct. at 579)); see also 18 WRIGHT 
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   Justice White concurred in the judgment in Stauffer to stress 
the fact that at the time of Stauffer II, the Sixth Circuit had 
not yet ruled on the substantive issue whether private 
contractors were "authorized representatives" under the Clean Air 
Act.  According to Justice White, preclusion would not have been 
appropriate had the Sixth Circuit already clearly resolved the 
legal issue in question:  
 
Extending preclusion to circuits that have 
adopted a contrary rule on the merits would 
be acceptable were it supported by any 
affirmative policy.  It is not.  Judicial 
economy is not served for the simple reason 
that no litigation is prevented; the prior 
litigant is subject to one black-letter rule 
rather than another. 
 




& MILLER, supra, § 4425, at 199 (Supp. 1994) ("The reasons for 
caution are sufficiently strong . . . to rely on the opinion 
[Stauffer] as a possibly appropriate response to the specific 
case without reading it as establishing a new general policy."). 
In sum, the exception continues to apply following Stauffer. 
C.  Application of the Unmixed Questions of Law Doctrine 
 The exception to the application of issue preclusion 
for unmixed questions of law is satisfied, as we have explained, 
only when the previously determined issue is one of law, and 
either (1) "the two actions involve claims that are substantially 
unrelated" or (2) "a new determination is warranted in order to 
take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal 
context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the 
laws."  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2).  We take up the two 
facets of the exception in turn. 
1. Substantial Relationship 
 In determining whether two cases involve claims that 
are "substantially unrelated," we must assess whether the two 
cases involve the same application of law.  A party cannot 
satisfy the “substantially unrelated claim” test where "the same 
general legal rules govern both cases and . . . the facts of both 
cases are indistinguishable as measured by those rules."  18 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 4425, at 253-54 (footnotes omitted).  As 
the Supreme Court recognized in Stauffer, issue preclusion does 
not require that the "two cases presenting the same legal issue 
must arise from the very same facts or transaction before an 
estoppel can be applied."  Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 172 n.5, 104 S. 
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Ct. at 579 n.5.  In fact, estoppel will be applied unless "the 
‘issue of law’ arises in a successive case that is so unrelated 
to the prior case that relitigation of the issue is warranted." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 The Atlantic Mutual case, like this one, involved the 
denial of an indemnity claim by Burlington based solely on a 
Burlington contention that the claim was time barred because the 
claimant, in that case OOCL, had failed to provide notice of its 
claim within a time period specified in Burlington Rules 
Memorandum 2-C.  And, like the provision in this action, the 
provision in Atlantic Mutual measured the limitations period from 
the date of delivery.0  Like Hyundai’s claim here, the viability 
of OOCL’s claim in the Atlantic Mutual action turned on the 
question whether the general rule for indemnity accrual and the 
concomitant commencement of limitations periods should apply 
regardless of a contractually defined period.  As we have stated, 
the Atlantic Mutual court, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, 
concluded that a "[]claim for indemnification is not barred by 
the limitations period in Burlington Northern’s Rules Memorandum 
2-C," Atlantic Mutual at *12, since "an action for 
indemnification accrues at the time of the indemnitee’s payment 
despite a shorter contractual time limitations period applying to 
                                                           
0Burlington’s clause in Atlantic Mutual provided that "all suits 
against BN [Burlington Northern] shall be commenced no later than 
1 year after the date of delivery."  Atlantic Mutual at *5. In 
this case, the limitations clause specified that "any claim for 
loss or damage to lading shall be filed with BN [Burlington 
Northern] within nine (9) months of the date of delivery of the 
shipment."  App. at 107. 
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claims between the parties," id. (citing States S.S. Co. v. 
American Smelting & Refining Co., 339 F.2d at 70 (9th Cir. 
1964)). 
 In our view, the issue of law arising in this action is 
not "so unrelated" to the decision of the court in Atlantic 
Mutual "that relitigation of the issue is warranted."  Stauffer, 
464 U.S. at 171, 104 S. Ct. at 579.  Indeed, the issue and its 
application are identical.  Hyundai, like OOCL, seeks to recover 
in indemnity from Burlington on the grounds that a limitations 
period prohibiting shipment damage claims presented beyond a 
specified time cannot start running until the time that liability 
is determined or a cognizable loss is incurred, since actions in 
indemnity do not accrue until such time.  If this rule for the 
accrual of actions in indemnity were applied in the present 
action Hyundai’s claim would have been timely presented, like 
OOCL’s claim against Burlington in the Atlantic Mutual action. 
 While, as Burlington points out, the contractual 
limitations provision in this case provides for a shorter period 
of time (nine months as opposed to one year), and applies to the 
presentation of "claims" as compared to the filing of "suits," 
these distinctions are of no legal significance to the issue 
decided in Atlantic Mutual and presented here.  In both cases 
Burlington denied the indemnity claims on the grounds that they 
were untimely because the contract term limited liability to a 
period of time (commencing at the date of delivery) that had 
already run.  Similarly, in both actions, the indemnity claimant 
sought recovery notwithstanding such provision on the grounds 
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that any time limit for indemnity claims must commence when 
liability is determined or a cognizable loss is incurred.  In 
sum, given these relevant similarities, we cannot conclude that 
the issue of law arising in this action is so unrelated to the 
Atlantic Mutual case that relitigation of the issue is 
warranted.0 
2. Intervening Change and Inequitable Administration 
 When two actions involve claims that are not 
"substantially unrelated," issue preclusion still does not apply 
to an issue of law if a new determination of the legal issue is 
warranted "in order to take account of an intervening change in 
the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable 
administration of the laws."  See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. 
McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1356 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2) (internal quotation marks omitted)), 
rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 
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  This conclusion accords with the decision of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1167 
n.4 (5th Cir. 1981), which reasoned that non-mutual offensive 
collateral estoppel should apply "‘if the question is one of the 
legal effect of a document identical in all relevant respects to 
another document whose effect was adjudicated in a prior 
action.’"  Id. at 1167 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 68, Reporter’s Note cmt. c at 18-19 (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 
15, 1977)). The Hicks decision involved successive actions by 
former employees of Quaker Oats for benefits under a special 
retirement program.  At issue in both actions was whether a 
letter from a member of Quaker Oats management announcing the 
terms for a special new retirement plan was enforceable as a 
binding bilateral contract.  While the court ultimately ruled 
that the first decision should not be given collateral estoppel 
effect because the initial decision was based on an alternative 
ground, the court first rejected the argument "that estoppel 
should not apply because the erroneous holding of contractual 
liability is a pure question of law."  Hicks, 662 F.2d at 1166.  
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113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); see also Haitian Ctrs., 969 F.2d at 1356 
("‘Relitigation of an issue of public importance should not be 
precluded when there has been an intervening change in the 
applicable legal context.’" (quoting Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 
475, 476 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Montana, 440 U.S. at 163, 99 S. Ct. at 978 
("Unreflective invocation of collateral estoppel . . . could 
freeze doctrine in areas of the law where responsiveness to 
changing patterns of conduct or social mores is critical.").  No 
such concerns are present in this case. 
 Burlington does not point to, and we are unaware of, 
any intervening change in the applicable legal context which 
would warrant new consideration of the issue decided against 
Burlington in Atlantic Mutual.  Moreover, application of issue 
preclusion in this case would not constitute an inequitable 
administration of the laws.  Burlington was aware of Hyundai’s 
claim at the time of the Atlantic Mutual litigation, and it had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the legal issue in the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Washington. 
 We also believe that application of issue preclusion is 
particularly appropriate in this case, given that reconsideration 
of the issue already addressed in Atlantic Mutual would reward 
Burlington’s attempt to forum shop.  See Fulani v. Bensten, 862 
F. Supp. 1140, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("To rule otherwise would 
encourage the parties to forum shop, thereby undermining the 
purpose of collateral estoppel in promoting the finality of 
judgments.").  By instituting this action for declaratory 
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judgment in New Jersey, Burlington seeks to avoid the result that 
would have been reached in a court within the Ninth Circuit, 
where this case would more properly have been brought since the 
facts and parties to this action have virtually no connection to 
New Jersey.0   
 Having already litigated and lost this issue within the 
Ninth Circuit in Atlantic Mutual, Burlington now attempts to 
institute another action raising the same issue within another 
federal circuit in the hopes that this court would reach a 
conclusion different from that previously reached.  But, as we 
have stated, "once an issue is actually and necessarily 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that 
determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a 
different cause of action involving a party to the prior 
litigation."  Montana, 440 U.S. at 153, 99 S. Ct. at 973. 
Accordingly, Burlington cannot now relitigate this issue that it 
already contested and lost in Atlantic Mutual.  Issue preclusion 
applies.0 
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  None of the facts underlying this action occurred in New 
Jersey and neither of the parties are incorporated or have a 
principal place of business in New Jersey.  The underlying case 
involves indemnity for a damage claim originating from a shipment 
traveling from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Pusan, South Korea via 
Seattle, Washington, and the litigation from which the indemnity 
claim arose was within the Ninth Circuit.  See Tongil Co. v. 
Vessel Hyundai Innovator, 968 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1992). 
0
  As mentioned, supra note 12, Justice White concurred in 
Stauffer so as to stress the fact that issue preclusion should 
not be applied within a Circuit where the Court of Appeals had 
already clearly ruled on the substantive legal issue.  We need 
not address this concern, since this court has yet to directly 
opine on the substantive issue implicated by this case -- whether 
a contract provision can, consistent with COGSA and its 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the district court granting summary judgment to Burlington, and 
remand the case with the direction to grant issue preclusive 
effect to the applicable legal issue resolved by the District 
Court for the Western District of Washington in the Atlantic 
Mutual litigation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
amendments, override the general common law rule governing 
accrual of claims and running of statute of limitations in 
indemnity actions.  See National Post Office Mail Handlers v. 
American Postal Workers Union, 907 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
("The doctrine of issue preclusion counsels us against reaching 
the merits in this case, . . . regardless of whether we would 
reject or accept our sister circuit’s position."). 
